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INTRODUCTION 
 
In their own ways, both Sweden and South Korea (hereafter, Korea) have served as 
“models” of economic development but financial crises in the 1990s dimmed their 
reputations for economic success during the post-war period. The crises and their aftermath 
both prompted questions about political and economic structures and offered opportunities 
to reform them. Our two countries are renowned as leading examples of European social-
corporatism and Asian state-corporatism (see H.-R. Kim, 2007: 210–12) respectively but our 
study departs from established ideas about corporatist “arrangements whereby” according to 
one authority “organized interests participate directly in the formulation of government policy” 
(Pontusson 1991, p. 163). Instead, we attempt to deploy Charles Tilly’s approach to the 
study of contentious politics (Tilly 1995; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tilly 2001; Tilly 2006). 
More particularly, we deploy his arguments about democratisation to study contention during 
a financial crisis.   
Tilly’s dynamics-of-contention (DOC) approach to comparative studies assumes that 
much more is in flux than is the case with more familiar approaches. This includes not only 
the nature of the context and relations among actors, but also the identity of actors, relations 
between actors and the available “repertoire” of contention, and relations between actors 
and available sites of contention. With a new approach, definitions are important.   
  Contentious politics involves: “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers 
of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of 
claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at 
least one of the claimants” (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001, p. 5). Contentious politics thus 
defined excludes routine politics that follow established procedures within accepted 
institutions. Tilly and his collaborators are careful not to allow a contrast between contentious 
and routine politics to become a binary opposition set in concrete (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 
2001, p. 7) . In our episodes of contention during financial crisis, strikes tend to be 
contentious in Korea and routine in Sweden but the new connections that striking unions 
seek to broker with other groups test the boundaries between contention and routine in both 
countries.   
Repertoires of contention are“ “the limited, familiar, historically created arrays of 
claim-making performances that under most circumstances greatly circumscribe the means 
by which people engage in contentious politics” (Tilly 2006, p. vii). Repertoire of contention 
resemble the way good jazz players innovate around well known standards during 
performances that are neither boring nor avante garde happenings. Contention succeeds 
when one actor innovates on a familiar repertoire in an effective way. An obvious example is 
the way Ghandi’s civil disobedience proved effective against the British in India and subse-
quently inspired both the African National Congress in South Africa and the civil rights 
movement in the USA. 
  Episodes of contention have a common problem (in our case how unions, 
governments, and corporations cope with the local consequences of economic globalisation 
during a financial crisis) that crucial causal mechanisms constitute or produce (McAdam et al 
2001: 28-29). These episodes are not self-evident nor do episodes of any type (say 2 
 
revolutions, democratisation, or strike waves) follow the same pattern or exhibit the same 
characteristics (McAdam et al 2001: 29). Moreover, each episode is only ever the construc-
tion of participants, witnesses, commentators, and historians. These episodes involve 
iterative actions and reactions by established and emerging actors who invent, hone and 
reject new forms of action in uncertain circumstances of shifting opportunities and threats 
(McAdam et al 2001: 31-32).   
We focus on three causal mechanisms that Tilly argues are crucial during 
democratisation (Tilly 2001: 25-25, 36-37, McAdam et al 2001: 264-304). They are: a) 
changes in trust networks; b) cross-class alliances; and c) the brokerage of new connections 
between actors and sites of contention. Critics of the DOC have wondered about the great 
number of possible causal mechanisms (Koopmans 2003) but it seems to us that since 
globalisation threatens de-democratisation (Tilly 1995) then these causes of contention 
during democratisation offer plausible explanations of the causes of contention during 
financial crises. Our case studies explore these causes but how do we delimit our episodes?   
The criterion for delimiting our episodes that we deploy is when the respective 
national governments turned to international actors in search of means for managing the 
local consequences of the financial crisis and when contention against this turn ceased. 
Globalisation arguably entails a generalised threat against the rights, and particularly the 
workers’ rights of collective action, that nation states uphold and governments administer 
(Tilly 1995, 16-20). On this measure, the Swedish episode began in February 1990 with the 
government’s sudden declaration of intention to apply for membership of the European 
Union and ended in January 1995, when Sweden joined the EU after a referendum 
endorsing membership. The Korean episode began in June 1996, when Korea applied to 
join the OECD and ended in 1999 with the failure of general strikes over the conditions of 
the International Monetary Fund’s rescue package. There are three attractions for using this 
criterion. One, the episodes have a clear beginning and ending. Two, severe financial crises 
and the end of full employment dominated all politics during the periods delimited above. 
Three, the governments’ turn to international actors and institutions is consistent with 
contentious politics, which by definition includes government responses to claims such as 
the assertion of workers’ rights. 
 
SWEDISH CONTENTION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
On 7
th February 1990, the Treasurer of the minority social-democratic Government 
announced a crisis package that included command-economy proposals to freeze wages, 
prices, rents, dividends, and taxes, along with a ban on strikes during 1990 and 1991 (Feldt 
1991, pp. 456-69). An unheralded declaration of intent to apply to join the EU was almost an 
aside, underlining how serious the Government was about controlling inflation. A week later, 
the Riksdag rejected the bill, the Government resigned, and the Treasurer resigned from 
politics altogether. After another week, the social democrats formed a new minority 
Government. The only aspect of the uncommon drama of the second and third weeks of 
February in 1990 (Vandenberg 1990; Vandenberg and Dow 1991) that had longer-term im-
portance was the Government’s sudden declaration of intent to apply to join the EU. In 
retrospect, it is clear that the Government had effectively declared it no longer had any faith 
in the capacity of the Swedish Employers’ Federation and the union peak bodies to 
negotiate non-inflationary national wage agreements. Feldt’s successor, Allan Larsson, 
made further attempts to institute public controls over wage -setting but they also failed. In 
January 1991, Larsson’s budget speech included a phrase that reducing inflation had to 
come before all other goals. Many interpreted this as the formal end for the long-standing 
priority of full employment (Svenning 2005, pp. 53-55). When the bourgeois parties replaced 
the democrats at the September 1991 elections, they had no qualms about making reduced 
inflation the first priority of public policy. 
  During 1990, major developments took place in the routines of industrial relations. In 
the 1980s, the large engineering corporations (Volvo, Electrolux, Ericsson, and so forth) had 
managed to persuade the metalworkers to settle wage contracts separately from the 3 
 
centralised negotiations between the Swedish Employers’ Federation and the several union 
peak federations. In 1990, the employer federation finally gave way to the engineering 
corporations and declared that it would no longer negotiate wages or conditions at a national 
level with the blue-collar Confederation of Unions. It backed this up with a decision to close it 
offices of statistics and negotiations and a year later it withdrew all representatives from the 
many boards, committees, and inquiries that had built up around tri-partite ‘democratic 
corporatism’ over almost ninety years (Rothstein 2002).   
  Serious economic problems also developed during 1990. The real-estate price 
bubble burst in May. By October, bankrupted real estate developers in Stockholm, London 
and Brussels sent Sweden’s largest finance company Nyckeln bankrupt. The collapse of 
Nyckeln and other finance companies revealed extensive exposure in the partially privatised 
Nordbanken, SE-Banken, Första Sparbanken, and Gotabanken. During 1991-92, the social 
democratic Government paid 65 billion crowns to Nordbanken in return for shares when it 
bought the bankrupted Gotabank, It also demanded shares from Första Sparbanken.in 
return for guaranteeing its loans. When the economy recovered and the value of the banks’ 
shares also recovered, the government could sell its shares and recover about half of the 
money it had given the banks (Bäckström 1997).   
  The comparatively high rates of inflation during the second half of the 1980s, the 
break down in centralised negotiation of wage setting, the collapse in real estate values, and 
then the banking crisis all contributed to the currency crisis of September and November 
1992. The final factor was a change in government in September. Devaluations are most 
commonly undertaken by a new government that seeks to wipe the slate clean so to speak 
and compensate for the loss in international competitiveness usually supposed to have been 
caused by the wage inflation that had accumulated under the former government. However, 
contrary to international speculation, both the social democrats and the incoming bourgeois 
government repeatedly disavowed any recourse to devaluation and supported conforming to 
the stable-currency and low-inflation criteria for EU membership. The British Government 
and other participants in the partial pegging regime of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (a forerunner to the European Monetary Union) also sought stable currencies 
and made the pursuit of low inflation the first priority of public policy. However, the collapse 
in real estate values and the associated banking crisis kept the risk of devaluation open. 
Britain invested its gold reserves heavily in maintaining the value of the pound but on 16
th 
September 1992, the speculation proved too great. The British allowed the pound to float 
completely but in Sweden, the Riksbank continued to resist the same course. On 17
th 
September it imposed a daily instrumental interest rate of 500 percent per annum, and it was 
prepared to impose a marginal rate of 4,000 percent if necessary (Bäckström 1997; Dennis 
1998, pp. 49-56). The Riksbank succeeded in the short term and the daily instrumental rate 
fell back to 20 percent but by November, the number of bankruptcies and the strain on the 
banking system forced it to give up and allow the Krona to float completely. Resisting de-
valuation because of the inflation it would generate imposed higher interest rates and saw 
many small export-oriented companies lose business, but more employment was lost in the 
public sector. During 1990-94, about 185 thousand people lost work in industry and another 
100 thousand in private services (such as banks) but cuts to public spending saw 253 
thousand people lose work in the public sector (Ehrenberg and Ljunggren 2006, p. 126).   
Poor economic circumstances saw the electorate return the social democrats to 
office in September 1994. During the election campaign and before the referendum held in 
November, the popular social-democratic Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson led a successful 
Yes campaign to join the EU. Along with Finland and Austria, Sweden officially joined the EU 
in 1995. How did the Government manage to persuade a majority of the voters to agree to 
join the EU and what consequences did this have for patterns of protest against the 
Government? To answer these questions, we take up three of Tilly’s causes of 
democratisation: a) trust networks; b) cross-class alliances; and c) brokerage of new 
connections. 
  Swedish citizens’ networks of trust remain well integrated in the public sphere of 
debate, policy formation, and policy implementation. This is a legacy of the way the labour 4 
 
movement and other social movements mobilised during 1890-1920 to pursue 
democratisation as a ‘joint project’ with liberal elites who also dissented against an anti-
democratic conservative regime (Collier 1999: 83-85). Unions and social movements 
developed strong links between workplaces, local chapters, co-operatives, and neighbour-
hood organisations and their respective central committees or bodies, which had a strong 
national presence (Rothstein 2002, p. 295). Unions in Sweden remain both strongly decen-
tralised, with strong local negotiation of piece rates for example, and highly centralised, with 
well-staffed national offices and extensive engagement in industry-wide wage negotiations 
and all manner of public enquiries and boards of public authorities (Higgins 1985; Kjellberg 
1997; Kjellberg 2007). During the 1990s, however, membership in many different civic 
associations has declined somewhat from internationally very high rates. In 1993, 92 percent 
of the adult population had chosen to belong to at least one civic association and by 2001 
this had declined to 89 percent (Persson 2003, p. 11) but older people belong to civic 
associations in greater proportions than younger people (Vogel, Amnå et al. 2003, pp. 58, 
64, 70-71). There is an important nuance in this picture of high but declining social capital in 
networks of trust. 
Bo Rothstein (2002, pp. 330-31) argues that networks of trust among citizens in the 
wider community remain strong and vibrant but that since the end of the 1980s, unions are 
less well integrated in public decision-making because national union leaders and corporate 
leaders no longer trust each other. He attributes the breakdown in elites’ trust in each other 
to, first, the unions’ mobilisation for economic democracy and the social democrats’ 
legislation of extensive union rights at work from the mid-1970s, and second, the employers’ 
neo-liberal counter-mobilisation during the 1980s. From our dynamics-of-contention perspec-
tive, ideological mobilisation and counter-mobilisation is important but insufficient explana-
tion of the differential changes in the networks of trust because it relies on the actors’ views 
of the world. A fuller explanation needs to include consideration of how fragmentation within 
both the union movement and the employers’ federation affected their relationships with 
each other, with the Government, and with sites and repertoire of contention. 
Since the early 1970s, technological development and structural change in the global 
economy had been pushing the global competition-exposed engineering employers to 
dissent from the approach that the Employers’ Federation took in the central wage 
negotiations with the blue-collar Union Confederation. The engineering employers disputed 
the wisdom of accepting that ongoing wage-rate compression was the price for no-strike 
clauses in central agreements. They demanded that other employers and unions must allow 
wages in the competition-exposed sector to be the benchmark for national wages according 
to national productivity increases. When this failed to happen, they sought greater flexibility 
in local piece-rate setting in order to cope with the merging of blue- and white-collar tasks 
and to compete for scarce skills in a full employment economy. In 1983, they used high 
wage offers to persuade the metalworkers to negotiate independently of the central wage-
setting procedures but it was not until 1990 that they could finally persuade the Employers’ 
Federation to abandon national wage-setting altogether. Peter Swenson and Jonas 
Pontusson (2000) argue that it was a cross-class alliance, between the engineering 
employers, the metalworkers, and a bargaining group of white-collar unions in private 
industry that brought centralised wage negotiations to an end. The timing of the changes to 
wage-setting procedures speaks for the agency of the engineering employers’ active choices 
because the imperatives of technological and economic structural change developed 
gradually over a long period, but how did this cross-class alliance effect other actors and the 
relationships between all actors, sites of contention, and repertoire of contention? 
The most direct effect of the cross-class alliance between the engineering employers, 
the metalworkers, and the white-collar engineering workers was to ally actors in export-
oriented manufacturing against three groups of actors shielded from global competition. 
One, they allied against both large retailers who could pass the cost of higher wages on to 
their customers and the large timber and paper manufacturers whose wage costs were small 
compared to their capital costs (Swenson and Pontusson 2000, pp. 92-94). Two, they allied 
against public-sector employers who could either trim their capital maintenance costs in 5 
 
schools, hospitals, and so forth or lobby for higher taxes to cover the wage increases. Three, 
they allied against public-sector unions that mobilised around feminism (Higgins 1996) to 
attack the a gap between men’s private sector wages and women’s public-sector wages for 
comparable work. From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, inflation aggravated tensions 
between the engineering employers and other parties to wage contracts. They insisted that 
manufacturing productivity had to be the benchmark for wages throughout the economy 
while other employers’ were more interested in no strikes or could avoid or pass on their 
increased wage costs, and the public sector unions mobilised against the gendered pay gap 
between the public and private sectors. Between 1976 and 1982, successive bourgeois and 
socialist governments used currency devaluations to adjust for inflation. The social 
democrats’, liberals’, conservatives’ turn to the EU saw socialist and bourgeois governments 
abandon devaluation as a last resort and join the trade-exposed employers’ and unions’ 
cross-class alliance against non-trade exposed employers and unions. 
A second effect of the pro-EU cross-class alliance was that militant unions outside of 
the trade-exposed sector began to consider collaboration with the anti-EU communists or 
greens in parliament and began to support diverse groups opposed to the EU. The municipal 
workers drew upon feminism to motivate campaigns against privatisation and authoritarian 
managerial practices (Higgins 1996) and they have paid local officials to help organise the 
Stockholm social forum (Interview: Ann-Terese Mörch 26
th March 2004). The Commercial 
Workers’ Union organised a successful consumer boycott of Toys ‘R Us (Vandenberg 2006) 
and mobilised its younger members to support the clean clothes campaign against child 
labour (Interviews: Stefan Carlén 26
th February 2007; Sven Englesson 1
st March 2004). The 
Confederation of Unions has also attempted to forge connections with the campaign for a 
Tobin tax. In the Toys dispute and other campaigns, unions formed connections with anti-
globalization and anti-EU groups but their achievements have been defensive rather than 
constructive; they have been a matter of resistance against unwelcome incursions on 
established rights rather than a matter of, say, advancing industrial democracy or scaling 
back the prerogatives of management. Part of the reason why the pro-EU cross-class 
alliance is stronger than the anti-EU groups is that they can present themselves as 
competing for a proud and wealth-generating place in a rapidly globalizing world, while anti-
EU groups turn in on a national sense of identity to resist the insecurity that flows from 
globalization and integration with the EU. 
 
KOREAN CONTENTION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The effects of democratisation on the Korean development model were becoming apparent 
by the mid 1990s. The government applied for membership of the OECD in 1996. The 
application was rich in symbolism: Korea had transformed from one of the world’s poorest 
countries in the early 1960s to a member of the “rich countries’ club” only three decades 
later, with income levels reaching $US10,000 per person. However, Korea was required to 
further open its economy, including the financial system, to international markets. The 
government embraced the liberalisation of the economy on the grounds that a trade-
dependent country should foster competition rather than avoid it. The government also 
sought to increase the “flexibility” of the labour market, including the employment guarantees 
that had accrued in earlier decades. The manufacturing sector witnessed particularly strong 
improvements in wages and conditions due to successful campaigns by unions aligned to 
the independent Korean Council of Trade Unions (KCTU). In response to complaints from 
the chaebols that wage increases were destroying their competitiveness, the government 
passed a raft of amendments to the Labour Relations Law in late 1996. The aim was to 
make it easier for firms to lay off workers (Kong, 2006: 371). Unions strongly opposed the 
removal of employment protections, and staged massive strikes. For the first time, the state-
aligned federation and the KCTU joined forces to oppose the rollback of labour rights. Under 
pressure to end the strikes, the government agreed to repeal the most restrictive elements of 
the new legislation in March 1997. A compromise was reached whereby unions acceded to 6 
 
limited job security in return for greater freedom to organise. The government also granted 
pay increases to both public and private sector workers (Buchanan and Nicholls, 2003: 218). 
Evidence that the chaebol-centred development model was faltering was not difficult 
to find. A mid-sized chaebol, the Hanbo Group, declared bankruptcy in early 1997. Hanbo’s 
loans came at low interest rates and allowed the group to record extraordinarily high levels 
of debt, even by the standards of the chaebols (Schopf, 2001: 709–10). The government 
nationalised Hanbo, but its collapse shook investor confidence. The collapse of Kia Motors 
followed a few months later. This loss of confidence became especially important when 
investor panic spread across Southeast Asia in the second half of 1997. Within months 
lenders were scrutinising the debt levels, investment patterns and corporate governance 
practices of the chaebols. By year’s end, Korea was forced to apply to the IMF for a loan to 
repay the costs of actual and potential corporate failures. In return for a bailout loan from the 
IMF, the Korean government agreed to a range of changes: spending was reduced, reforms 
were enacted to increase the quality of loans, and new regulations were introduced to 
improve standards of corporate governance. The IMF also recommended that the flexibility 
mechanisms that were originally mooted in late 1996 be introduced without amendment 
(Hundt, 2005: 245–7). 
Amid the financial crisis Kim Dae-jung, who survived assassination and imprisonment 
at the hands of authoritarian regimes, won the presidency at his fifth attempt. Unlike his 
predecessors, was somewhat amenable to bringing non-traditional elites into government. 
The trust networks of civic movements thus began to move into the public sphere at the 
same time as the state–chaebol networks of privilege and corruption were coming under 
scrutiny. The new government recruited civic groups to support elements of its chaebol 
reform agenda such as the enhancement of corporate governance. The “small shareholders’ 
movement”, for instance, sought to ensure that chaebols called annual general meetings as 
required in their statutes, other groups campaigned for the appointment of outside directors, 
and some civic groups provided input to social policy by suggesting incentives for women to 
re-enter the workforce. Some representatives from civil society even served as Cabinet 
ministers (H.-R. Kim, 2000: 603–4; H.-R. Kim, 2007: 216–19; Lim and Jang, 2006: 449–51; 
Peng and Wong, 2008: 79–80). 
In order to ease the implementation of the IMF’s rescue package, the government 
invited the rival union federations to partake in the Tripartite Talks. Both federations had 
supported Kim during the election campaign (Kong, 2006: 377–8), and this was the first 
attempt to establish a social pact between labour, government and business. The February 
6 pact expanded basic labour rights, allowed for the formation of a teachers’ union, and 
allowed laid-off workers to join a union. Unions won the right to establish a political party, 
and the KCTU won belated recognition as a peak body. The pact largely removed the 
expectation of job security, although the government established a multi-billion dollar fund to 
compensate workers for job losses resulting from restructuring (Ha and Lee, 2007: 910–11). 
The unions had a range of motivations for participating in the talks. First, the union 
federations argued that the chaebols were largely responsible for the financial crisis. They 
argued, for instance, that the embattled Kia Motors was a well-run firm that had experienced 
temporary liquidity problems, in part due to the bigger chaebols’ monopolisation of credit 
markets. The unions recognised the value of positioning themselves on the side of reform 
during a time of national crisis (Burkett and Hart–Landsberg, 2000: 200). Union leaders 
proposed that chaebol restructuring proceed via job sharing and wage freezes. In other 
words, while agreeing to the new “flexibility” mechanisms, unions sought to save jobs. The 
public was wary of any group that appeared to share the chaebols’ opposition to reform. As 
one union official recollected: “There had been and was a very strong mood among the 
members to fight but members were worried about how their actions would be interpreted 
within the overall context of the economic crisis itself. They found it difficult to be seen as the 
people who rock the boat at a time of difficulty” (quoted in Neary, 2000: 4). 
Second, the talks went some way towards fulfilling the aspirations of union leaders to 
alter their status as outsiders to routine politics. Unions emphasised the symbolism of the 
talks, and Yoon Young-Mo of the KCTU argued that: “Labour could now be included and 7 
 
recognised as a pillar of the society, as a value in itself as an organised progressive force. In 
this way you could philosophically change the way in which labour was perceived in society” 
(quoted in Neary, 2000: 4). 
Third, unions could change their organisational strategy. Instead of operating solely 
at the enterprise level, they recognised an opportunity to create industry associations (Kong, 
2006: 376). Some of the legal barriers to creating such structures were removed, although 
problems remained in terms of collecting membership fees at the industry and national 
levels. Consequently the fledgling industry unions had been ill equipped to undertake 
nationwide negotiations over wages and conditions with government and employers 
(Buchanan and Nicholls, 2003: 221). 
Despite the unions’ willingness to compromise, the government played the most 
forceful role in the restructuring process. Kim Dae-jung proposed that the chaebols 
undertake asset swaps to reduce overcapacity and indebtedness. The state dictated the 
terms of restructuring, and the Minister for Finance and Economy warned: “the public must 
understand that reducing employment by 10 to 20% through restructuring is a way to 
prevent a situation where 100% of jobs are lost to unemployment in the future” (quoted in 
Song, 1999: 91). 
This left unions with less autonomy than initially envisaged. Problems arose when the 
union federations returned to their members with details of the pact. Delegates voted to 
reject the agreement, which placed the brunt of the burden for reform on workers (Chang 
and Chae, 2004: 432–4). With their constituents opposed to the proposed model of 
restructuring, some union leaders saw no option other than to return to non-routine strikes, 
sit-ins and protests to press their claims on government. However the government reverted 
to authoritarian means of coercion—such as the violent suppression of strikes and the arrest 
of union leaders—to halt industrial disputes (Ha and Lee, 2007: 912). Two examples 
illustrate the government’s response to the unions’ reversion to non-routine politics. 
First, Hyundai Motors announced in early 1998 that 10,000 workers would need to 
accept voluntary redundancies for the company to survive. More than 8,000 workers opted 
for early retirement. While individual members acted in what they perceived as their self-
interest, the Hyundai union viewed voluntary redundancies as a direct threat to its strength. 
The union proposed saving jobs through wage cuts and job sharing. When the company 
rejected these options, 30,000 union members went on strike in July 1998 to oppose further 
redundancies and factory closures. After holding out for two months against the company 
and government, the union capitulated. In the face of the government’s threat to break the 
strike via heavily armed riot police, the union agreed to the sacking of more than 200 
workers and the dispatch of more than 1,200 others on extended unpaid leave—bringing the 
total reduction in the workforce close to the 10,000 mooted only months earlier. Despite two-
thirds of members rejecting it, the deal was ratified (Neary, 2000: 3–5). 
A second dispute illustrated the partial revival of links between unions and other 
elements of civil society. The student movement supported a strike by about 2,000 subway 
workers in April 1999 by sheltering workers on a university campus. However the students 
proved incapable of protecting the workers from the repressive powers of the state. Student 
activists claimed that their efforts to support workers did not attract widespread support: 
“There are a whole generation of young people in the universities for whom the student 
activists are very unpopular. They are too militaristic and their songs and language and idea 
have nothing to do with them” (quoted in Neary, 2000: 7). 
The failure of the campaign damaged efforts to create links between the unions and 
affiliated civic groups. Both federations had threatened to quit the Tripartite Talks on several 
occasions, but were persuaded to return. Under pressure from the government to rein in 
militancy, the KCTU had cancelled three general strikes in 1998. The subway strike was 
intended to form the “first wave” of a series of rolling strikes in the spring of 1999, but the 
harsh treatment of the subway workers dissuaded secondary action by affiliated unions. The 
KCTU cancelled the strike, and also quit the talks. The failure of the strike marked the end of 
the contentious episode in Korea. The cross-class coalition failed to maintain its unity and 
sense of purpose in the face of state repression and the state’s maintenance of links with the 8 
 
chaebols, the IMF and some middle-class social movements. For their part, affiliated civic 
groups found fault with the unions’ strategies, highlighting the philosophical differences 
between the two wings of Korean civil society. Park Won-Soon, the leader of one middle-
class group, argued that the main problem was the unions’ inability to persuade the wider 
public that their campaign for worthy of support: “In the French case, the public will support 
subway workers if they go on strike, but it’s not that case for us... Labour has to present 
evidence that strikes are in the interests of society, not just the working class” (quoted in 
Yoon, 2001: 72). 
 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our comparison of episodes of contention during financial crises in Sweden and Korea 
shows that the respective Governments’ turn to the EU, the OECD, and the IMF had de-
democratising effects upon the role of unions in public-policy formation. The turn to 
international bodies fragmented unionism. Prior to the financial crisis in Sweden, the blue-
collar Union Confederation had managed to maintain some solidarity across the public and 
private sectors even as high inflation had aggravated its long-standing insider status. 
Inflation strained relations between the unions and both the Employers’ Federation and the 
social-democratic Government that undertook liberalising reforms during the 1980s. After the 
financial crisis, the metalworkers remained insiders when they joined a pro-EU cross-class 
alliance with the engineering corporations, the social democrats, liberals, and conservatives 
while public-sector unions turned to EU-sceptical outsiders among the communist and green 
parties and diverse newly established social movements. Prior to the financial crisis in 
Korea, insider unions in the pro-authoritarian government peak council of unions joined the 
outsider unions in the militant and independent peak council to support the first non-military 
President elected in 1997. There was also a broad alignment between all unions and the 
middle-class civic movements calling for greater corporate accountability. After the financial 
crisis, the independent union council had abandoned the beginnings of social-corporatist tri-
partite discussions and reverted to its outsider status as it again deployed a familiar 
repertoire of contention against the new government, which for its part reverted to a familiar 
repertoire of authoritarian repression of militant unions. In Sweden, the metalworkers chose 
to remain insiders and part of a pro-EU cross-class alliance, while in Korea, comparable 
groups of workers in competition-exposed manufacturing chose to revert to contention 
against the government from the outside. Either way, the Government benefited from the 
fragmentation of unionism as different unions pursued routine or contentious politics. 
  Another effect of the Governments’ turn to the international bodies was that both 
countries moved, from the left and from the right, towards an international neo-liberal 
mainstream, so to speak, among contemporary nation states. This effect was de-
democratising for Sweden, which abandoned full employment and like the EU made low 
inflation the first priority of public policy. However, the same effect was democratising for 
Korea, which abandoned the authoritarian development model of corporatism without labour 
as it imposed greater accountability upon its chaebol and granted unions new rights at the 
same time as it also abolished life-time employment security among chaebol workers. 
If the two conclusions above amount to observations of shifts in the structure of 
unionism and in the ideological repercussions for various actors’ views of the new situation, 
how did our causes of democratisation fare as explanations of shifts in relations between the 
elements of contention during the financial crises? The analyses of networks of trust among 
unionists and other social movements and between union and corporate leaders produced 
nuanced pictures of why some unions chose insider negotiations with Governments while 
others chose outsider contention as financial crisis imposed serious threats to workers’ 
livelihoods. The analyses of cross-class alliances produced nuanced pictures of why various 
unions chose different means of attempting to make the most of the opportunities posed by 
the financial crises. However, the Governments of both Korea and Sweden proved 
themselves better at brokering new connections between domestic and international sites of 
routine politics. These connections constituted a somewhat optimistic and cosmopolitan 9 
 
sense of identity founded upon managing to manufacture goods that were competitive on 
world markets. In the circumstances of financial crisis, this cosmopolitan identity prevailed 
against nationalist identities that failed to broker strong connections in either national or 
international sites of contention.   
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